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During the Cold War the so-called grand strategy of the U.S. did nőt 
change a lót. By ‘grand strategy’ we mean the relationship between the 
military tools and the International commitments; that is, the assessment 
and the determination of the potential threats to a country and what tools 
this country wishes to use to counter them. (Layne 1994:19). Washington 
was pursuing a ‘positional grand strategy’ fór about forty years between 
the laté 1940s and the early 1990s: it treated one country (the Soviet 
Union) or, by extension, one group of countries (the Communist States) as 
the single most threatening challenge to its national security and did all its 
best to weaken and contain these potential adversaries. In contrast, the 
U.S. seems to have adopted a so-called milieu grand strategy after the 
conclusion of the Cold War, that is, the collapse of Communism in East 
and Central Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union; in the lack of 
a concretely defined enemy country or group of countries The Americans 
have been trying to shape the international environment in accordance of 
their long-term security interests.
Acquiring the position of a hegemon—and later on, retaining it— 
enjoyed a priority among the Cold War objectives. By hegemony we 
mean a preponderant military, economic, and political power. Under the 
definition, the U.S. obtained the status of a hegemon in the non- 
Communist parts of the world during the Cold War. The System thus 
created can best be likened to a hub and spokes. The U.S. stood in the 
center of each of the military alliances in the capitalist world (NATO, 
ANZUS, SEATO), the financial and commercial organizations (IMF, 
World Bank, GATT—the ‘Bretton Woods’ system), as well as the 
political ones (OAS, UN) in the early Cold War years. This situation was
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modified by the appearance of the so-called non-aligned countries (the 
Bandung Conference, 1955); in other words, the gradual fading away of 
the bipolar world and the zero-sum game approach and the emergence of 
the concept of a multipolar world in piacé of it. The acceptance of the 
hegemony of the U.S. in the capitalist world was based on three factors. 
One, the potential competitors had been defeated during the World War 
(Germany, Japan) or weakened dramatically (Great Britain, Francé). Two, 
the Americans offered useful ‘Services’ in the military, economic, 
Financial, and political fields; that is, they were behaving as a ‘benevolent 
hegemon’ (Layne 2002:187). Three, at least as far as the European and 
Asian capitalist countries were concerned, the U.S. pút a security 
umbrella over them and, thus, made it possible fór these countries to build 
up the welfare State. The military preponderant power was realized in 
developing a nuclear triad (gound-, sea-, and air-based) of both tactical 
(theater) and strategic nuclear forces. The ‘massive retaliation’ of the 
1950s was replaced by the ‘flexible response’ and the tendency started in 
the laté 1950s and early 1960s seems to survive even nowadays. More 
specifically, the transformation of the U.S. armed forces has been moving 
towards az ever more flexible, mobile, smaller, and more lethal strategies 
in harmony with the concept of attempting to shape the milieu in the First 
piacé. At the same time, preponderant power determines more than ever 
the grand strategy of the U.S.: currently, Washington is spending rougly 
as much on-defence related issues as the rest of the world. However, it 
does nőt translate itself intő a more secure environment fór the U.S.; in 
fact, somé even argue that the U.S. has to face more complex and less 
manageable challenges now than during the Cold War.
It was the so-called Wesphalian system that characterized the 
international relations between the mid 17th century through the very end 
of the 20th century; that is, it was almost exclusively the (nation)states 
that were the actors in international life. However, with the ending of the 
Cold War, a great number of non-state (supra. and substate) actors 
appeared on the world stage. It turnéd out that the U.S. was able to play 
the role of a hegemon in the capitalist world during the Cold War, bút it is 
unable to assume the role of a global hegemon. Military, political, and 
economic power has become more and more dispersed; in fact, this 
process ocurred within a number of States as well. The emerging ‘failed’ 
and ‘failing’ States, that is, those which are unable to assume the functions 
characterizing the ‘normál’ States, have substantially contributed to a 
more unstable world and forced the U.S.—and somé other members of
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the international community (e.g., NATO during the Kosovo-crisis)—to 
reconsider their security concepts. The Cold War ‘grand strategy’ of the 
U.S. became useless; a number of asymmetrical challenges emerged in 
piacé of the symmetrical threat posed by the Soviet Union. The two 
pillars of the Cold War ‘grand strategy’, containment and deterrence, or 
the ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD) proved to be effective against 
States which were pursuing rational goals. Nowadays, a lót of terrorist 
groups are different from the ‘traditional’ terrorists, insofar as they are 
pursuing irrational goals; while containment and deterrence are alsó 
inefficient against ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ States either. At the same time, the 
security agenda has become wider; it includes from fighting international 
terrorism through drug abuse to environmental degradation. Meanwhile, 
the international positions of the U.S. have weakened in areas apart from 
the military one: while the U.S. produced close to 50 percent of the 
world’s GDP in the laté 1840s and about a third a decade later, now it 
accounts fór only about a fifth of the totál industrial production in the 
world. Moreover, her political hegemony has alsó weakened: the 
European allies are heading fór a post-Westfalian, post-modern 
interpretation of international relations with a hevy dependence of ‘soft 
power’, while the majority of the American strategic thinkers still view 
the world in terms of power relations (similarly to the Russians and 
Chinese among others).
The postwar military and security planning in the U.S. can be 
divided intő three distinct phases. First, the period between 1989 and 
1991, that is, from the collapse of Communism in East and Central 
Europe to the Gulf War; then from the Gulf War to September 11, 2001; 
and, finally, the period since 9/11. In generál, the first one was 
characterized by George H. W. Bush’s “New World Order” concept, a 
sort of neo-Wilsonian idea, according to which the Soviet Union had 
ceased to be an enemy, instead, it had become a (strategic) partner in 
settling the conflicts all over the world, the primary fórum of which 
should be the international organizations and settlements should be based 
on the principles of international law. The Gulf War in 1991 was the 
culmination bút, at the same time, the conclusion of this strategic 
thinking. As regards the former idea, Saddam Hussein’s aggression 
against Kuvait brought about an agreement rarely if ever seen before by 
the major powers in the world; the United Nations Security Council 
unanimously authorized the international community to restore the status 
quo ante in Kuvait and dozens of different States took part in the military
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operations under American leadership. Regarding the latter idea, the Iraqi 
invasion pút an end to the dream that armed aggressions had disappeared 
from international life. It showed the the small and medium-sized States 
on the peripheries still wished to settle pent-up tensions by resorting to 
the use of force, and the world was still far from a post-modem world in 
which violence does nőt play a significant role in international relations. 
In sum, the use of force had become Tegitimate’ in the relations between 
States. (Tucker and Hendrickson 7). Moreover, the dissolution of formerly 
multiethnic countries (primarily Yugoslavia bút alsó the Soviet Union) 
drove home the lesson that non-state actors did play a decisive role in 
international relations; the number of the variables dramatically increased 
and this fact made strategic planning more, and nőt less, complicated and 
difficult in areas such as force planning or force structures.
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that though caesure was reál it 
was nőt as sharp as meets the eye; continuity seems to have been more 
dominant than discountinuity in strategic thinking. The official positions 
taken by both the Republican and the Democratic administrations in the 
1990s, as well as such unofficial documents like the Defense Policy 
Guidance (1992) or the Report o f the Commission to Assess the Ballistic 
Missile Threat to the United States (The Rumsfeld Report) (1998) 
unanimously called fór the maintenance of the hegemony of the U.S. The 
Defense Policy Guidance, which was written by such ‘hardliners’ as Paul 
Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard Perle, Andrew Marshall and I. 
Lewis Libby stated that the U.S. should maintain such mechanisms which 
would deter the potential competitors from even trying to play a more 
prominent régiónál or global role. It defined the ‘vitai’ regions fór the 
U.S.; they incorporated Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the 
former Soviet Union, and Southeast Asia. It basically meant that the 
authors were still thinking within the geopolitical framework as defined 
by Nicholas Spykman in the early 1940s; that is, the paramount strategic 
goal of the U.S. should be the prevention of the emergence of a Eurasian 
hegemon. The next year (1993), the strategic defense review initiated by 
the first Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, of the Clinton Administration 
officially pút the strategy of containment to rest and envisioned the future 
of the national security policy of the U.S. in strengthening the existing 
international organizations and the creation of new ones in the spirit of 
the structuralist approach to international relations and the liberal 
internationalist traditions. However, it wished to use these intruments fór 
strenghtening deterrence. {Report on the Bottom-Up Review). It is
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obvious, that ‘deterrence’ remained relevant to somé extent from among 
the Cold War strategies; while ‘containment’ received a new lease of life 
insofar as George H. W. Bush and Bili Clinton alike attempted to apply 
‘dual containment’ conceming Iraq and Irán—with mixed results. These 
two States, together with North Korea, featured prominently in the so- 
called Rumsfeld Report in 1998 as the most imminent danger to the U.S. 
because they—or, in generál, countries wishing to produce nuclear 
weapons—tried to diminish the capability of the U.S. to resort to the use 
of force in regions close to them. In sum, their overall goal is to deny 
unrestricted U.S. influence—that is, to challenge U.S. hegemony. The 
Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997, mandated by Congress to be 
prepared every four years, alsó identified these three States as the most 
dangerous régiónál adversaries. The document, among others, claimed 
that the U.S. should expect az armed action on behalf of these emerging 
powers against the U.S. or her allies before 2015. In addition, it calculated 
with the appearance of a global competitor after 2015—in the person of 
Russia or China. The defense posture, accordingly, provided fór the 
prevention of adversarial régiónál powers, as well as fór the deterrence of 
any potential aggression against the U.S. or her allies. In generál: 
prevention and deterrence constituted the core of national security 
strategy besides the creation of régiónál stability.
The Clinton Administration did nőt pay too much attention to 
foreign and security policy initially; the Democrats had won the 
presidential election in 1992 partly because they had placed domestic 
politics intő the center of their platform. The continuity in security policy 
was first broken to a certain extent in 1993 when National Security 
Adviser Anthony Laké suggested that the administration move away from 
containment towards enlargement. The origins of this concept can be 
traced back to Woodrow Wilson, who claimed that the national security 
of the U.S. depended on the international environment. So long as 
parliamentary democracy and a functioning markét economy prevail in 
the majority of the countries in the world, the U.S. is safe. As regards the 
premise, there is more or less a consensus in the American national 
security elite; the difference that has emerged within it centers around the 
question whether the U.S. should only show an example or she should 
actively promote the spread of such systems (‘democracy export’). Lake’s 
view found its way intő the national security doctrine of the Clinton 
Administration in 1995. The document entitled A National Security 
Strategy o f Engagement and Enlargement unambiguously endorsed the
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latter option: it declared that the increase of the number of ‘markét 
democracies’ was standing in the center of the national security of the 
country, while the threats should still be ‘deterred and contained’ (A 
National Security Strategy o/Engagement andEnlargement 2). The goals 
were traditional, however, somé new tools could be discovered, as least as 
compared to the Cold War ones. Thus, the ‘opening of foreign markets’ 
and ‘the spread of democracy abroad’ were given special emphasis 
besides the creation of ‘cooperating security structures’ (2-3). However, 
one can already discern one of the most controversial decisions of the 
American administrations after the Cold War: the reinterpretation of the 
‘Westphalian’ sovereignty. The NSS of 1995 mixed no words in stating 
that “sovereignty does nőt protect any govemment if it violates humán 
rights” (ii). Such an interpretation of intemational law was later expanded 
by the Bush Administration in the early 2000s; it maintained that if one 
State is unable to function properly (e.g., to exert exclusive control over 
its territory), then it should nőt be entitled to enjoy sovereignty because a 
failed or failing State poses a threat to the whole intemational community. 
This is the point when the U.S. officially expanded its national security 
concern and commitment globally after the Cold War. This horizontal 
expansion started with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, then it was 
complemented in quick succession after the Second World War with the 
Truman Doctrine (American security guarantees to Greece and Turkey); 
the Eisenhower Doctrine (the Middle East); and the Carter Doctrine (The 
Persian Gulf). This principle alsó denotes the meeting point of the 
geographic and the functional aspects of the extended U.S. national 
security concept. It is true that the strategy—to a certain in a contradictory 
manner—stated that the armed forces of the U.S. would only de deployed 
“where the interests and values are threatened to a large extent” (ii). This 
way the Clinton Administration took a step toward “selective’, though 
‘cooperative’ hegemony; in other words, the administration left a door 
open to define the venue of armed intervention while watering down the 
prior universalistic rhetoric (Posen and Ross 43-44). However, the 
Clinton Administration was critized severely fór intervening in places 
such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosni, and Kosovo where American interests were 
nőt directly threatened.
The intervention in Kosovo in 1999 has special relevance to the 
topic. Here, one of the basic pronciples of the national security strategy of 
the Clinton Administration was challenged: the ‘enlargement’ of the 
democratic community in Central and Eastearn Europe. Second, the
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future of NATO was on stake too after the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Pact. The supporters of the reálist scholl of intemational relations and 
those of isolationism both argued that there was no need fór the North 
Atlantic Alliance any more. However, keeping the Soviet Union ‘out’ of 
Europe had only been one of the main reasons of the conclusion of the 
Washington Treaty in 1949. The other two, that is keeping the U.S. ‘in’ 
and Germany ‘down’, still seemed to be relevant. (Regarding the latter, 
one should recall the British and French worries about the re-unification 
of Germany.) As a matter of fact, ‘keeping Russia out’ became a priority 
of the Central and East Europeans after they (re)gained their 
independence. The way out was moving forward, i.e., on the one hand, 
incorporating the so-called out-of-area operations intő the missions of 
NATO and, on the other one, using the Alliance as a tool fór expanding 
the zone of security and stability and to create a Europe ‘whole and free’, 
which could become an appropriate partner fór the U.S. in handling the 
new challenges which emerged outside of Europe. One can alsó add that 
the U.S. wanted to prevent the ‘re-nationalization’ of military matters in 
Europe by maintaining NATO and, thus, continuing assuming a 
substantial burden in the defense of the continent. (Layne 1994:27). 
Kosovo was alsó a touchstone of the 1998 A National Security Strategy 
fór a New Century, which placed the following three goals intő the center 
of the country’s national security: the enhancement of security at home 
and abroad alike; the increase and spread of economic wealth in the 
world; and the support of democracies. Moreover, it categorized national 
interest sas follows: vitai (e.g., the physical security of the territory and 
population of the U.S.); important (affacting the security of the U.S. 
indirectly, such as mass immigration from Haiti); and humanitarian and 
other interests (e.g., preventing or alleviating natural amd man-made 
catastrophes). (A National Security Strategy fór a New Century 5). 
Kosovo got intő the category of ‘humanitarian disaster’; in addition, the 
govemment had lost its legitimacy—and national sovereignty—by having 
used excessive force against certain groups of its own people. In final 
analysis, the Clinton Administration—as an unintended consequence— 
helped undermine the legitimacy of one of the most important 
organizations created after World War II with the strong support of the 
U.S.—the United Nations—as well as the principle of national 
sovereignty.
The A National Security Strategy fór a New Century States on the 
first page that U.S. security requires that American should play a leading
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role in the world if the Americans wish to live in safety at home. The 
organic linking of internál and external security enjoys an overwhelming 
support within the national security establishment with the possible 
exception of the isolationists (such as, fór instance, Patrick J. Buchanan). 
At the same time, the intervention in Kosovo exposed somé potentially 
ominous frictions within NATO as well. The difficulties arising from the 
necessity of coordinating with each of the NATO members and the 
problems of interoprability between the U.S. and the European forces in 
generál strengthened the positions of the supporters of the ad hoc 
coalitions; as Donald Rumsfeld pút it later, the “mission should define the 
coalition” and nőt the other way round. In a broader context this approach 
means that the U.S. should nőt take too many views by the allies intő 
consideration and, therefore, can pút more stress on realizing purely 
American interests and values; in other words, can act unilaterally. 
Although it is generally the George W. Bush Administration that is 
credited with lifting unilateralism intő the U.S. national security strategy, 
practically no American President has ever excluded unilateral action in 
case it was needed; more specifically, the A National Security Strategy fór 
a New Century in 1998 already declared that “We should always be ready 
to act alone” when this step is the most advantageous to the U.S. (2).
The attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001 meant a turning 
point in the national security strategy of the U.S., though we cannot speak 
about a U-tum at all. We can speak about the opening of various Windows 
o f vulnerability since at least Pearl Harbor. The Japanese attack on 
December 7, 1941 destroyed one of the pillars of contemporary American 
national security: the belief that the two oceans were able to keep away 
any potential enemy. The second ‘pillar’ of contemporary U.S. national 
security, the Royal Navy, was weakened beyond repair as well. The next 
‘window of vulnerability’ was opened in 1949, with the explosion of the 
Soviet atomié bomb, then in 1957, with launching the Sputnik, that is, a 
vehicle capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) over 
the territory of the U.S. The attacks against New York City and 
Washington, D.C. dramatically changed the threat perception in the U.S.; 
the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006 States in its introduction that the 
country is fór a long war (1) and The National Security Strategy o f the 
United States published the same year starts with these threatening words: 
“America is at war ...” (1). The National Security Strategy o f the United 
States of 2002, that is, the one that was born immediately after 9/11, 
identified the greatest threat to the U.S. in the meeting of ‘radicalism and
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technology’; the nightmare scenario fór the American national security 
elite is the one in which radical (predominantly Muslim) groups acquire 
WMD with the help od mediation of rogue or failed or failing States. To 
counter these threats, speciall attention is paid to the support of open 
societies because they constitute the hasis of “internál stability and 
intemational order”. (iv.) One of the basic principles of the strategy is the 
idea of liberal internationalism: to make the world nőt only safer bút alsó 
better. (1) The tools to achieve these goals have become commonly 
known as the Bush Doctrine; the various elements of the doctrine 
appeared int he 2002 NSS and the different speeches of the President 
(specifically, the State o f the Union speech on January 29, the speech at 
West Point on June 1, 2002, and the second Inauguration Address on 
January 20, 2005). The most important points are as follows: the 
prevention of the spread of WMD (non-proliferation); deterring the so- 
called rogue States; the active support of freedom and the institutions of 
democracy; unilateral steps if the security of the U.S. requires it, and 
preventive or pre-rmptive use of force if needed. Besides deterrence, great 
stress was pút on the development of force structure and technological 
assets fór meeting the challenges under the nuclear threshold, that is, the 
so-called full spectrum dominance, reál time battleground control, and 
the C44 {Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and 
Intelligence). It alsó stressed the so-called staying power, that is, the 
capability to invade and keep territories in the conterinsurgency 
operations, as this ability may prove to be decisive in wars on terrorists 
and/or guerillas. (Shanker 1).
The two most controversial elements of the so-called Bush Doctrine 
are reserving the right of unilateral military steps in case there is no 
authorization from the appropriate intemational organizations (primarily, 
the U.N.) and the right of preventive or pre-emptive military strikes. First, 
it must be noted that neither of them is new in American national security 
thinking. As regards the former one, let it suffice to refer to the Clinton 
Administration; while concerning the latter one, the U.S. (NATO) 
reserved the right of the first use of WMD throughout the Cold War (it is 
still part of the official strategy of NATO) and endeavored to keep the 
potential adversaries in suspense as to when and what military measures 
the U.S. would take in case of an intemational conflict. The Bush 
Administration was attacked fór these ideas primarily because the 
majority of the rest of the world professed a different threat perception 
and, therefore, took a different view with regard to the possible counter-
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measures. First, the Bush Administration believed that the potential 
synergy of the new security challenges (terrorists + rogue/failed/failing 
States + WMD) constituted an existential threat to the U.S. and the 
international order at large. Second, the Republican administration was 
convinced that the existing international organizations and legal tools 
were inadequate to handle the new security challenges and, therefore, 
Washington was forced to take, if it was needed, unilateral measures in 
defense. (Thus, fór instance, China and Russia are predominantly 
interested in—soft—balancing the U.S. globally and, therefore, take 
every opportunity to weaken the U.S., even at the price of supporting or 
propping up regimes which harbor and asisst terrorists or States which are 
engaged in producing WMD; both of these great powers are members of 
the UNSC, where they can vető any measure to be introduced to punish, 
fór instance, proliferating countries.) From the above premises, the idea of 
preventive or pre-emptive steps derives logically: given the current 
technological capabilities and the relatively easy access to sensitive 
information, these measures appear in new light. A next logical step from 
this notion is the revision of the principle od State sovereignty. The Busg 
Administration strongly believed that the U.S. would face ‘probably’ 
asymmetrical challenges in the future. Therefore, force structure should 
be adjusted to the new environment: as the potential adversary is nőt so 
easily foreseeable as it was during the Cold War, the U.S. should develop 
a new, ‘capability based’ model. {Quadrennial Defense Review, 
September 30, 2001, iii). Besides the military measures, the Bush 
Administration committed itself to ‘transformational diplomacy’\ that is, 
encouraging the creation of democratic institutions so that the political 
leaders of the countries could be made responsible fór whatever happens 
in their State.
In contrast to the analysis of the Bush Administration, most of the 
people outside the U.S., and somé inside as well, do nőt consider 
international terrorism a strategic threat. They believe that the roots of the 
problem is predominantly economic and social, so military steps are 
misplaced. Moreover, unilateralism is alsó rejected partly because of the 
danger of precedent, and partly because the neo-conservative approach to 
State sovereignty, ad adsurdum, may threaten the security of any State in 
the world and, in the spirit of Realpolitik, the latter will increase their 
efforts to provide fór their own security which, in turn, may result in a 
global arms race and a dangerously high level of arms buildup. Third, the 
critics call attention to the fact that these ‘existential threats’ require the
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efforts by the whole or the majority of the international community; 
therefore, resorting to unilateral steps could nőt eradicate the problem. In 
addition, there were structural problems in the Bush Administration’s 
approach to alliances. The Rumsfeldian ‘the mission determines the 
coalition’ requires that the common platformshould be found again and 
again in each new ‘coalition of the willing’, while there is no need fór 
such complicated and time-consuming process in an alliance based on 
commonly professed interests and values. (Brooks and Wohlforth 51; 
Daalder, Lindsay and Goldgeier 413.) Zbigniew Brzezinski added that ad 
hoc coalitions are, by definition, fór a short time and of tactical natúré, 
while what the U.S. really needs are strategic alliances. (Brzezinski 35). 
The former National Security Adviser to President Carter alsó suggested 
that these strategic partners should come from Europe as the European 
countries are the ones sharing the more or less similar interests and values 
with the U.S. and nőt Russia or India. (Brzezinski 60).
As it was already mentioned, other great powers, primarily Russia 
and China, consider U.S. dominance/hegemony a threat to their national 
interests and, therefore, do their best to balance the Americans. At the 
same time, retaining the leading role (hegemony) in the world is at the 
very center of the U.S. national security strategy. As The National 
Security Strategy o f the United States (2006) puts it: “We wish to shape 
the world” instead of being just a part of the transformation of the world 
order. (1). The U.S., consequently, wishes to maintain ‘hegemoniac 
stability ’ and ‘democratic peace ’ in the world. (Owens 26) Hegemony 
means trying to create an international environment which is most 
beneficial to the country concerned. Though hegemoniac stability is nőt 
necessarily a zero-sum game, that is, it can bring greater stability and 
prosperity to other States as well (the post-World War II West European 
situation is a case in mind), a number of countries which do nőt profit 
from this system are bound to attempt to altér the situation and, thus, are 
likely to make the international order less stable. (Layne 2002:177). The 
American ‘transformational diplomacy’ (democracy export) may be 
perceived as an attempt to undermine the authoritarian rule—certainly 
this is the prevalent view in Russia and China. Moreover, most of the 
European countries have grave doubts about the feasibility of exporting 
democracy; they believe that any democratic transition should be a 
bottom-up organic process, in which the creation of appropriate political 
institutions (e.g., a representative body, etc.) should only follow genuine 
and gradual economic and social transitions. It must be mentioned that
421
while the first Bush Administration made relatively huge afforts at 
democracy export (nation building), especially in the Middle East, it 
shifted toward stability—a more restrained and realistic goal between 
2005 and 2009.
During the Cold War the major adversary was a totalitarian 
ideology and, accordingly, the major ‘front’ was the struggle fór the 
‘hearts and minds’ of the people. After the attacks on 9/11, President 
Bush. Fór a very short time, held Islam responsible fór the atrocities. 
However, the Administration soon changed the rhetoric and the main 
target became ‘radical Islamists ’—that is, nőt the whole religion bút those 
who used it fór advancing their radical and violent agenda. Nevertheless, 
the ideological dimension did nőt disappear from the American strategic 
thinking: The National Security Strategy o f the United States in 2006 
unambiguously declared that the fight against terrorists would be a 
military one in the short run, bút an ideological battle in the long run. (9).
There are several different theories to describe the current 
international situation. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. claims that the world is neither 
unipolar, nor multipolar. He likenes the world to a three-dimensional 
chessboard. On one ots its level, that of military might, the U.S. enjoys 
undisputed superiority. On the second, economic level, there are several 
centers of power; while on the third one, on the relations among States, 
power is dispersed to a large extent because it is on this level that the non- 
state actors appear. (Nye 58). Fareed Zakaria writes about ‘the rise of the 
rest’ and he alsó suggests that power is widely dispersed among the State 
and non-state actors in international life. Parag Khanna does nőt only see 
the relatíve loss of power by the U.S. as the main dynamic in today’s 
international relations, bút he alsó believes that the EU and China are 
losing influence on the global geopolitical ‘markét’ as well. Róbert Kagan 
speaks about the return of great power rivalry which characterized the 
19th and 20th centuries, bút he adds that the ideological struggle has alsó 
reappeared after being declared ‘dead’ by Francis Fukuyama in the early 
1990s. Nina Hachigian and Mona Suthpen calls attention to the fact, 
though, that ideological rivalry belongs to the pást because the potentially 
most dangerous centers of power to the U.S. from a strategic point of 
view—Russia, China, and India—in reality do nőt pose any serious 
ideological challenge to Washington; the challenge they do pose is 
predominantly technological. (Hachigian and Suthpen 43-44) Stephen 
Van Evera adds that the U.S. should break with Spykman’s geopolitical 
theory: it does nőt have any relevance in today’s world whether one
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country gains hegemony in Eurasia or nőt. (Leffler and Legro 259). 
Moreover, these potential rivals are in the same security ‘boát’ with the 
U.S.: transnational terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, climate change, 
pandemics, environmental degradation, etc. affect them as much as they 
do the Americans. To solve these problems, strategic cooperation is 
needed; and the U.S. should reconsider its ‘go-it-along’ mentality and 
give up a portion of its sovereignty.
The Obama-administration has alsó committed itself to maintain the 
basic strategic goal of its predecessors: maintaining the leading position 
of the U.S. in the world. Besides the protection of the American soil and 
population, the Democratic Administration still concentrates on the 
nonproliferation of the WMD, the prevention of the synergy between 
transnational terrorist groups and WMD, the delay of the rise of global 
and régiónál rivals, as well as the support of parliamentary democracy 
and free markét economy. However, a shift can be perceived toward the 
‘soft’ areas: public diplomacy and the improvement of the image of the 
U.S. have been given a more prominent role than in the pást few years. 
The other shift is toward a more hard-headed Realpolitik. the most 
obvious example is the attempt ‘to rését’ the relationship with Russia, 
which in practice seems to mean that Washington is willing to make 
concessions and symbolic gestures to Moscow in return fór closer 
cooperation in such strategic matters as nonproliferation or Irán. (The 
question is whether Russia is willing and/or capable of cooperating in 
these and other strategic issues.) Barack Obama seems to be downgrading 
Europe to a certain extent; the question the successive American 
administrations asked fór about half a century after 1945 was ‘what we 
can do fór you?’—as a strong Europe was absolutely necessary fór the 
security of the U.S. Now, it seems that this question is pút the other way 
round: ‘what can you do fór us?’ The vitai geographic and functional 
challenges to the U.S. fali outside of Europe nowadays and there is a 
preceptible shift of attention away from Europe to Asia in the first piacé 
in U.S. strategic thinking. The threat perception—and the recommended 
or preferred tools to handle them—continues to be different on the two 
sides of the Atlantic. The U.S. military posture has nőt changed a lót 
recently and the transformation of the U.S. armed forces continues to 
widen the capability gap between the U.S. and its allies within NATO. 
Therefore, the possibility of unilateral American action cannot be 
excluded in the future either. In sum, the U.S. ‘grand strategy’ that took 
shape in the 1990s shows more continuity than discontinuity under the
423
Democratic and Republican administrations; what has changed is mostly
the rhetoric and nőt the goals.
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